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ECONOMY VERSUS CARE: CHINA’S ECONOMIC
AMBITIONS AND A CONUNDRUM IN ALTERNATIVE CARE
INTRODUCTION
The citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could once
theoretically rest assured that the State would take care of their basic needs.1
Orphans and abandoned children2 were among those who could rely on the
central government’s guarantee of care.3 However, shortly after the death of
Mao Zedong in 1976, economic reform became a top priority.4 The State revised
its strategies and began to shirk its communist agenda.5 The shift in priorities
from implementing a successful class struggle (per the communist agenda) to
entry into global capitalist markets and fostering economic growth took center
stage.6 As the communist PRC7 began to wean its citizens off of welfare and
eliminate socialist work units, the way in which care was delivered between
1949 and 1978 also began to change.8 A new social method of foster care
transpired, the central tenet of which was sharing the responsibilities of orphan
care with individuals and families in the PRC.9 This method has presented a host
of issues—specifically, issues that grapple with the quality of care given10 and

1
XIAOYUAN SHANG & KAREN R. FISHER, CARING FOR ORPHANED CHILDREN IN CHINA 112–13, 116
(2014); see Mark Selden & Laiyin You, The Reform of Social Welfare in China, 25 WORLD DEV. 1657, 1657–
58 (1997).
2
The Comment will use the term “orphan” as officially defined by the PRC: “children under age eighteen
who have lost their parents through death or abandonment and do not receive support from others.” Liu Meng
& Zhu Kai, Orphan Care in China, 7 SOC. WORK & SOC’Y 43, 44 (2009) (emphasis added).
3
SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112–13, 116 (“Before the economic transition in the 1980s, under
communism the state took full responsibility for protecting orphaned or abandoned children in urban areas.”);
Meng & Kai, supra note 2, at 44.
4
SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112.
5
See id. at 112–13, 116. See generally Meng & Kai, supra note 2.
6
See SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112–13.
7
“China” has taken on a variety of different identifiers in even the last two-hundred years. To clear up
the different terminologies used throughout this Comment, going forward, the PRC will be used to describe only
post-1949 China. Later in this Comment, the Republic of China (ROC) will be used to describe post-1911 to
1949 China (not to be confused with modern-day Taiwan). To describe pre-1911 China, it will be referred to
either as either broadly as “dynastic China,” or specifically the “Qing Dynasty.” Ancient China will be referred
to as “traditional China.” Finally, for the sake of simplicity, “China” will then be used to describe the society in
a historical sense, consisting of all traditional China, dynastic China, the ROC, and the PRC periods. Please note
that, although confusing, the distinctions have historical significance and implications that will serve to explain
the history of alternative care in China.
8
SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112–13; Meng & Kai, supra note 2.
9
SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 111, 116 (“The previous welfare system, monopolized by the state,
was no longer enough to deal with the social challenges exacerbated by the market transition.”).
10
See id. at 113 (One “challenge was financial constraints. State investment fell behind requirements to
maintain welfare provision to orphans at an acceptable level.”).
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the sheer number of orphans that institutions would have to accommodate.11 The
Chinese government has tried to regulate around these issues, but it is today
confronted with the conundrum of striking a delicate regulatory balance between
the quality of care provided and the quantity of orphans cared for.12
I.

TOPIC AND SCOPE

This attempt to strike a regulatory balance has resulted in regulations that
one may argue should encompass a more comprehensive regulatory scheme—
like those of Western countries—if they are to succeed. However, this Comment
will not focus so much on asserting what policy fixes should be implemented or
attempt to dictate direct solutions. Rather, it will identify some exemplary
provisions from the regulations China has most recently implemented;
contextualize how those regulations fit or match China’s current identity in the
westernizing world; and explain why China’s socioeconomic and legal history
may prevent it or deter it from a complete adherence to “Western” models.
Although an outsider might be right to criticize seemingly incoherent
regulations, it is not apparent that anyone without intimate knowledge of
Chinese culture, history, and politics, as they relate to the current foster care
situation in China, would be well-positioned to dictate propositions to the PRC.
This Comment will highlight China’s foster care system and the struggle to
regulate it that China, in all its unique circumstances, faces as the country grows
as a modern state.
In particular, this Comment will discuss how China’s unique political,
economic, cultural, and historical foundations make Western regulatory
schemes improbable solutions for China’s alternative care dilemmas. This
Comment will also attempt to divert from tendencies of becoming an
imperializing or paternalizing Western critique. The scope of this Comment will
stick to dispelling the stigma that the PRC lacks law with respect to foster care
and explaining why, at least in the case of the PRC, the West should give the
PRC more room to assess its own needs and solutions.

11
See id. (“[D]uring market transition, the previous urban system of protection faced new challenges.
The first was that the number of orphans, especially children with disabilities, increased.”); Meng & Kai, supra
note 2.
12
See Wendy Zeldin, China: New Measures on Foster Families, Global Legal Monitor, LIBR. CONGRESS
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-new-measures-on-foster-families/;
Ministry Sets Stricter Rules on Foster Care, CHINA.ORG.CN (Sep. 29, 2014), http://www.china.org.cn/china/
2014-09/29/content_33643718.htm.
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II. PURPOSE
This Comment will provide a comprehensive view of the direct causes of
abandoned and orphaned children and the causes contributing to the
exacerbation of the issue by policy and regulatory shortcomings. It is designed
to engage in a theoretical discussion that brings the unconventional but realistic
conclusion that while researchers and scholars can continue to criticize, lambast,
laud, or inquire into how the PRC is regulating alternative care and whether they
are living up to Western expectations, the PRC itself, in its purported autonomy,
is in the best position to understand what will solve their foster care
conundrum.13 It will also show that China’s regulations, although increasing the
quality of care, end up restricting how many are able to be cared for by
disqualifying caregivers via stricter regulations, and that they do this by adhering
to General Assembly Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children.14 The only
way to understand this sliding scale is to understand that it is the result of the
PRC’s transition to a market economy15 and engagement with the globalized
world. Moreover, one can only understand the implications of a marketized
economy on alternative care and alternative care regulations if they understand
the history of China and, specifically, the history of orphans in China. The
purpose of this Comment is thus to provide an understanding of how all of these
factors are interrelated and use that premise to ground conclusions on the
complexity and uniqueness of the issue. The only reasonable conclusion this
Comment can arrive at is that the PRC must find its own way to balance quality
and quantity of care until it has the resources to endeavor to account for all of
the abandoned or abused children produced by its currently massive population.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE COMMENT
To organize these endeavors, this Comment will first explain the most
common types of alternative care used today and then define some of the direct
causes of the current foster care conundrum. This Comment will proceed to
explain some of the exemplary provisions from the Ministry of Civil Affairs’

13
It may go without mentioning that the PRC is unlikely to be receptive towards proposals on how to
handle their orphan population, regardless of how reputable the critic. See generally ROBIN MUNRO, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN CHINA’S STATE ORPHANAGES (1996);
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The Situation of Children in China,
XINHUA NET (Apr. 1996), http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/18/content_633190.htm [https://web.
archive.org/web/20160822094457/http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/18/content_633190.htm].
14
See G.A. Res. 64/142, Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, ¶¶ 118–27 (Feb. 24, 2010),
https://www.unicef.org/protection/alternative_care_Guidelines-English.pdf.
15
See SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112–13.
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most recently promulgated foster care regulations. Afterwards, this Comment
will delve into a historical discussion that will provide the understanding
necessary to realize China is its own special entity with such distinct legal,
historical, political, cultural, and economic foundations that it may not be
amenable to Western solutions.16 The historical discussion will trace from the
PRC to traditional China.
This discussion will mainly show why there is a foster care issue and how it
is a direct result of the greater sociopolitical and historical changes that China
has undergone in roughly the last century. The discussion will especially
highlight items such as the transition to a privatized economy in which the
government spends little on welfare17 and where the market provides incentives
that will, in theory, inevitably result in everyone’s basic needs being satisfied.
The following sections will specifically discuss how this economic transition
has left alternative care to only be accounted for by the State to a limited degree,
which, in turn, means that all of the foster children in excess of what the State is
willing to fund and bear18 will only be taken care of if a qualified foster family
accepts the duty—in exchange for a small stipend—to take these children on.
All children more than those cared for by the State and by foster families will
not be accounted for, legally or otherwise. The following will include analyses
of the issue at hand, including how the increase in regulations has decreased the
number of eligible foster families and how, although children will be safer in
comparison to an unregulated foster care industry, fewer children will be taken
care of as a result. Implications such as this, that occur as a result of the PRC
following international protocol, are precisely why the PRC cannot be
shoehorned into “universalized” solutions.
The nature of this seemingly simple issue19 is quite complex. The complexity
derives from the awkward position that modern China finds itself in—namely,
between coerced Western conformity,20 Maoist communism (known as

16
These categories of uniqueness influence foster care regulations by adding considerations that would
not pose an issue to Western lawmakers or regulation promulgators, such as population, economic goals, legal
priorities, political structure, and many other factors. This Comment will specifically focus on sociopolitical
changes in the twentieth century and, in turn, the change of economic goals that have come with the period of
economic reform and “Opening-Up.” See generally Martin King Whyte, Paradoxes of China’s Economic Boom,
35 ANN. REV. SOC. 371 (2009).
17
LESLIE K. WANG, OUTSOURCED CHILDREN 16 (2016).
18
See SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112–13.
19
This is not merely a regulatory and policy dilemma of balancing two competing factors.
20
See, e.g., TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 198–235 (2013).
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“Maoism”),21 the semi-colonial period, and the legacy of traditional China. This
adoption of various ideologies from throughout China’s long, constantly
changing history can be seen as the ultimate explanation for what the PRC
embodies—or does not—including its policies and law with respect to the status
of orphan care. Only by understanding the context will one understand the
conclusion of this Comment, which is, namely, that hegemonic Western
prescriptions requiring all states that wish to join the Western globalized world
to mirror the West may not suffice for China to realize its own prosperity in the
area of alternative care.
IV. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Since the PRC began the process of “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang)
in 1978, it has been moving towards a capitalist market economy while
maintaining an authoritative body that is reputed for tight control.22 The PRC
has since experienced its famous economic miracle and alleviated poverty for
over 600 million people in this transition.23 Despite joining the Western
globalized order, the PRC “is often presented dichotomously in the Western
media as either a land of freewheeling opportunity or a dangerous threat to the
industrialized world.”24 Essentially, the PRC has certainly been labeled an
antagonist to Western ideals and the “rule of law,” even while China has taken
great strides to appease Western requirements.25
Though the PRC has been prosperous in its economic transition, economic
disparities amongst its people continue to escalate, and many children have been
strongly affected by the socioeconomic transformations.26 Statistical analyses
use different definitions for “orphan” that create different results in measuring
the approximate numbers of the orphan population in the PRC.27 Using the
21
See generally Iskra Research, Maoism Versus Marxism, MASS. INST. TECH. (May 1994),
web.mit.edu/fjk/www/editor/essays/maoism.html.
22
WANG, supra note 17, at 5.
23
Id. (citing China Overview, WORLD BANK (May 13, 2015), www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/
overview).
24
WANG, supra note 17, at 5.
25
See, e.g., RUSKOLA, supra note 20, at 205–06 (2013) (relating to Western imperialism and strict
international institutional conditions on the PRC’s accession to the WTO).
26
WANG, supra note 17, at 5.
27
See id. at 7. For example, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “defines orphans as children
who have lost either one or both parents (and therefore may still be living with and/or supported by family
members),” which is a broader definition than the PRC’s definition. Id. (citing Orphans, UNICEF PRESS CENTRE
(June 10, 2015), www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html). The PRC uses a narrow official state definition
that includes only children under the age of eighteen who have “lost their parents through death or abandonment
and do not receive support from others.” Id. (citing Meng & Kai, supra note 2, at 143–57).
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PRC’s definition, the first government survey on orphans took place in 2005,
where the PRC said that the nationwide orphan count was 573,000, and that 86.3
percent of those orphans were in rural areas.28 The United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) China conducted a follow-up study in 2010 that found the
number of orphans had risen to 712,000, a twenty-four percent increase in a mere
five years.29 Moreover, the UNICEF figure does not even account for over
250,000 children estimated to have never been officially registered at birth due
to fear of one-child policy penalties, which would make them ineligible for state
benefits—including education.30
Traditional tendencies in China’s social culture seem to be a major cause of
the abandonment rates and the orphan issue.31 However, one could argue that
pre-1949 China had managed its orphan population with much more efficiency
than post-1949 China.
The first necessary step of the analysis is to understand specifically where
this quantity of abandoned children is coming from, and there appear to be many
social tendencies at the root of the issue. Because these traditional social
tendencies may not be relinquishable, regulatory precision by the central
government may be the most effective cure to the social ills brought on the
orphaned children of China.
A. Direct Causes of the Alternative Care Conundrum
As previously mentioned, China’s unique history—and all that comes with
it—is the contextual reason for the orphan care dilemma. However, there are
independent factors that directly contribute to abandonment rates that could fall
into three major, but not exhaustive, categories, including: gender preference
and the one-child policy, stigma towards children with disabilities, and rural
poverty in the face of massive wealth disparity. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. Gender Preference and the One-Child Policy
One of the traditional sociocultural traits contributing to the issue is male
preference among Chinese families.32 There are two inseparable prongs to this
28

Id.
Id. at 8. While there was not a subsequent follow-up to the 2010 study, twenty-four percent is certainly
an upward trend.
30
Id.
31
See infra, Part IV(A): Direct Causes of the Alternative Care Conundrum.
32
Quanbao Jiang et al., Demographic Consequences of Gender Discrimination in China: Simulation
Analysis of Policy Options, 30 POPULATION RES. & POL. REV. 619, 622 (2011).
29
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issue. First, there is the prevalent idea that it is better to have a son than a
daughter because a son is necessary for carrying on the family’s lineage. The
utility of having a son is seen to exponentially outweigh that of a daughter.33
This is particularly true in rural China, where a lackluster social security system
forces the immediate family to shoulder the responsibility of elder care.34 In this
situation, a son would be viewed as the designated family member to take on
such responsibility, as daughters are expected to marry and move away or, at
most, be equipped for “auxiliary help.”35 Thus, the elders’ need for financial
support is one practical reason why parents will favor sons,36 but the practicality
is attributable to antiquated views of gender roles being carried into modernity.
Females in rural China were viewed as a large investment of scarce resources
compared to what they would be able to return to their parents.37 “In rural
society, the gender distinction was crucial: girls needed care and nourishment
throughout early childhood, but unlike boys, they could not perform the heavy
labor required in most agricultural work.”38 Yet it seems reasonable to assume
that if a family were allowed to have more than one child, this would at least
lessen an issue of abandonment.39 This is where the second prong occupied by
the former one-child policy enters the discussion.
Although the rural population has been reputed for generally being the most
significant offender of abandonment, the one-child policy gave those rural
families a “second chance”40 by allowing them to have a second child if their
first child was a girl.41 Despite this “second chance,” the one-child policy was
the “most significant cause of child abandonment in the 1990s.”42 Couples who
had a second girl may still have chosen to abandon her to try again for another
son. While the policy attempted to accommodate the traditional implications of
gender in Chinese society, which may have had the effect of reducing
abandonment rates from what they otherwise would have been, it was still not
33

Id.
Id. at 621.
35
Id.; see also Meng & Kai, supra note 2. “Auxiliary help” suggests a less labor-intensive household help
that is not in as high of demand in a rural setting as the ability to labor in fields.
36
Julie Jimmerson, Female Infanticide in China: An Examination of Cultural and Legal Norms, 8 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 47, 52 (1990).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Of course, the economic and financial difficulties of rural Chinese families would have to be weighed
against the benefits of having a child to conclude on this issue.
40
It is noted that there are significant gender equality issues that the legislation attempts to accommodate;
however, while noting that, the discussion will persist in identifying this as a cause of abandonment, while letting
other academic discussions on equality and human rights concerns address the gender equality implications.
41
Meng & Kai, supra note 2.
42
Id.
34
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enough to account for all situations—specifically, rural families that had two
girls.43 For further evidence of gender being a prominent reason for child
abandonment in China, one need only look to the ratio of abandoned girls to
boys, where in 1989, a survey conducted suggested that ninety percent of the
abandoned children for that year alone were female.44 More recently, numbers
have begun to even out quite a bit, with some studies measuring only twenty
percent more girls than boys occupying child-welfare institutions.45 The
difference has been reduced in recent years, as “the impact of a traditional
preference for boys was declining as a reason for abandoning a child,” but is,
nonetheless, still a cause.46
Instances of abandonment tend to be most prevalent in rural families.47 So,
although it is primarily a specific portion of the population that generates the
quantity of abandoned children, that portion still makes up a substantial
44.38%48 of the population.49 With a current population of 1.371 billion people,
the rural population will make up approximately 608 million persons.50 Even if
it is not the sole contributor, it will ultimately be a large contributor to the orphan
and abandonment numbers.
2. Children with Disabilities
By the end of 1999, most infants abandoned in China were either girls or
infants with disabilities.51 There are likely several reasons a child with
disabilities might be abandoned, but two of the more prominent reasons will be
discussed here. First, a family may not have the resources to care for a disabled
child,52 even if it wanted to. Families in China often are unable to get the State
welfare support that would be warranted for parents to care for a child with a

43

See id.
Jimmerson, supra note 36, at 73.
45
See SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 106.
46
See id.
47
See WANG, supra note 17, at 7.
48
Despite being roughly eighty-two percent in 1976, this is still a substantial portion of the population.
Rural Population (% of Total Population), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.
ZS?locations=CN&year_high_desc=false (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
49
Id.
50
Population, Total, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
51
Meng & Kai, supra note 2, at 3.
52
Moreover, in some instances, a family may not have the resources to care for another child regardless
of whether the child is disabled.
44
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disability.53 When a child is born with a disability, a family too poor to provide
medical care or treatment for the child’s disability will abandon him or her in a
hospital or a foster care home with the hope that someone will find and care for
him or her.54
The second prominent reason for abandonment of disabled children in China
is a notion that underlies many of its causes—specifically, the traditional cultural
stigmas against the disabled that have also been brought into modernity.
Families who have a child with a disability or special needs often receive
“ridicule, shame, and economic hardship” because of it.55 Not only does this
create another reason for these families to abandon their disabled children, but
the reality of the shame and ridicule associated with a family that has a disabled
or special needs child will also reduce a disabled child’s chances of getting
adopted, for adopting parents would also want to avoid the stigma.56 This, paired
with the costs required to care for a disabled child, puts the child in the
predicament of being abandoned and then stuck in the care system indefinitely
without hope for adoption.57
Regardless of the reason behind the abandonment, the 1989 survey projected
around 10,000 children were abandoned each year in the Guangdong Province
alone, and that 22.6% of those children were deformed or handicapped.58
Another more recent study from 2005 rated the incidence of disability even
higher among orphaned children at 80.5%.59 However, this extraordinary
difference in percentages may be attributable to the 2005 survey’s method.60 For
example, the 2005 figure was not restricted to a single province, and the
definition of what it meant to have a disability had been broadened by 2005 to
include more “minor” conditions.61

53
Anna Jane High, China’s Orphan Welfare System: Laws, Policies, and Filled Gaps, U. PA. EAST ASIA
L.R. 126, 143 (2013).
54
Meng & Kai, supra note 2, at 3.
55
See High, supra note 53, at 143.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
Jimmerson, supra note 36, at 73.
59
High, supra note 53, at 137 (citing Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaoming Wu & Haiyan Li, Shehui Zhengce,
Shehui Xinbie yu Zhongguo de Ertong Yiqi Wenti (社会政策，社会性别与中国的儿童遗弃问题) [Social
Policy, Social Gender and the Problem of Infant Abandonment in China], 4 YOUTH STUD. 1, 1 (2005)).
60
But cf. WANG, supra note 17, at 6 (citing Barbara Demick, China Blames Pollution for Surge in Birth
Defects, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/02/world/fg-china-birth-defects2)
(“Between 2001 and 2006 birth defects jumped by nearly 40 percent, an increase that many have attributed to
environmental pollutants, particularly in coal-producing regions.”).
61
High, supra note 53, at 137–38. Minor conditions might include cleft lips or birth marks. Id.
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Another reason might be that healthier children are found and quickly
adopted;62 thus, the children remaining in orphanages are largely those with
disabilities.63 The errors that could be present in any given figure consist
primarily of not knowing how many abandoned children go unaccounted for.64
Abandonment is just one method families use to avoid being legally associated
with the child.65 There undoubtedly are others, though, such as infanticide and
sex-selective abortion. Furthermore, the only numbers that can really be known
are based on foster children in government-run or authorized-care institutions or
homes.66 It is impossible to know exactly how many children have been
abandoned, because if those children were not picked up by an entity that would
be able to include them in the census,67 then they would not be counted.68
Nonetheless, studies have concluded that disabilities are a main reason for
abandonment.69
3. Rural Poverty
Rural poverty is a factor many would believe to be a large contributor to the
quantity of abandoned children.70 However, it must be noted that some studies
have found no connection between abandonment and impoverishment.71 There
are also scholars who would say that, at least in traditional China, poverty was a
factor in infanticide, which for our purposes has foundational causes akin to
abandonment.72 It would seem logical that poverty might play some role in rural

62
It is acknowledged that there is a tense controversy over the abundant number of Western families that
have adopted Chinese baby girls, and this is a subject that will not be touched upon here beyond acknowledging
that adoption rates of Chinese girls from Western families has indeed been quite high in recent years, and that
this has had an effect on the number of orphans in China. See WANG, supra note 17, at 13–15.
63
High, supra note 53, at 138 n.47.
64
See David M. Smolin, The Missing Girls of China: Population, Policy, Culture, Gender, Abortion,
Abandonment, and Adoption in East-Asian Perspective, 41 CUMB. L.R. 1, 7–8 (2010).
65
See id. at 8.
66
Many orphans go unaccounted for, and uninformed abandonment rates prevent realistic numbers from
being available.
67
Children who do not go into the government’s care but still survive—or are picked up by a family—
presumably also go unaccounted for. However, if this situation occurs, then perhaps these children are classified
as being unofficially adopted rather than “orphaned” or “abandoned.” See id.
68
See id.
69
SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 106. One study reached the conclusion by viewing data collected
that indicated a large gender disparity between boys and girls without disabilities (specifically, a ratio of boys to
girls of 4:5), while disabled children had a more even gender ratio. See id.
70
See, e.g., SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 112.
71
Kay Johnson, Huang Banghan & Wang Liyao, Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China, 24
POPULATION & DEV. R. 469, 474 (1998).
72
See Smolin, supra note 64, at 7–8; see also SHANG & FISHER, supra note 1, at 9 (analyzing
abandonment and infanticide together).
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abandonment rates because low agricultural production has been found to be
“directly influenced by the number of children families had.”73 One might argue
that the more labor-able children that a family has, the more it will generate
production; thus, infanticide—or in our case, abandonment—of female children
would boost production rates if the family could have another boy, as mentioned
above. Further, one can see that if those are female children, whom traditional
society sees as unfit to contribute to the laborious work of rural China, then she
is both seen as not producing and solely consuming what the family produces.
However, there are many dissenters who would argue that in the countryside,
women are just as labor-able as men.74 Thus, while some would argue that there
is no connection, others would deem the strong correlation between orphans and
rural society as an indication that rural poverty is a contributor.75
B. China’s Regulatory Scheme Seeks Quality of Care
These causes of abandonment have contributed to a rising quantity of
orphaned children, which has been addressed by the Chinese government in
recent decades.76 Since 2004, the Chinese government has promulgated
regulations to crack down on the unsafe environments that many foster children
inhabit.77 In promulgating these regulations, the Ministry of Civil Affairs sought
to bolster the requirements for foster care homes, which has perhaps expanded
the scope of foster care to span beyond what Mao’s Communist state may have
done.78 The goal of these new regulations was to promote the rights79 of
abandoned children and help them reintegrate into society.80 Although there was
potentially more care available to orphans because the State expanded foster care
to the private sphere and included individual families in their efforts to combat

73

Jimmerson, supra note 36, at 52.
See, e.g., Why Girls are Abandoned in China, RESEARCH-CHINA (Oct. 5, 2005), http://researchchina.blogspot.com/2005/10/why-girls-are-abandoned-in-china.html.
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See WANG, supra note 17, at 8.
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See Jiating Jiyang Guanli Banfa (家庭寄养管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of Family
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See id.
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Opening-Up period, and in recent years we have seen a growing conception of human rights in China rather than
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abandonment rates, for a time there was a lack of regulation to control the
independent caretakers and set a minimum care requirement.
These 2004 interim regulations have since been modified and put into force
as ordinary regulations by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.81 This section discusses
three of the most striking or impactful provisions: a financial status requirement,
a family-child limitation, and an age requirement paired with an education
requirement.82 These may seem like worthy—and even necessary—provisions
to put in place. However, because there is already a surplus of orphans who do
not receive care, the State should acknowledge that tighter provisions, while
good for the orphans receiving care, will inevitably leave more orphans without
care. Article VIII of the Measures for the Administration of Family Foster Care
regulation sets out several requirements that foster families should meet to be
licensed by the State.83 Some of these provisions will be different than the
interim regulations, but they are largely similar.84
1. Article VIII(a) & (b): The Family Must Maintain at Least Average
Living Standards and Income
Article VIII(a) of the regulation states that a foster family should maintain
living standards that are not less than the local average, per capita.85
Additionally, the family’s income must be at least average for that region. This
provision eliminates foster families; not only does it eliminate families who
would otherwise be eligible to take care of foster children, but it also
discriminates on the basis of economic status against families who want to take
care of foster children. There may be instances where economic status does
negatively affect a developing child; however, when it comes down to a choice
between a child not having any caretaker or a child receiving care from a poor
family, the optimal choice is likely the latter.
2. Article VIII(e): Caregiver Age and Education Requirement
The regulation also prescribes an age range (both minimum and maximum
age) for a caregiver as well as an education requirement.86 It requires the “main
caregiver[’s]” age to be between thirty and sixty-five years old.87 This may do a
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Jiating Jiyang Guanli Banfa (家庭寄养管理办法), supra note 76.
See id.
See id.
Zeldin, supra note 12.
See Jiating Jiyang Guanli Banfa (家庭寄养管理办法), supra note 76.
See id.
Id.
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lot to reduce the number of available caregivers, especially on the latter end of
the spectrum. This would suggest that the effect of this part of the regulation is
negligible; however, with a substantial portion of the Chinese populace aging,
the number of Chinese within that age range will begin to deplete relative to the
number of caregivers currently within that range.
The education requirement seems to be less of an issue. It merely requires
that the caretakers have at least finished nine years of formal education.88 In
China, as this education is already provided by the government, this should
hardly be an issue unless potential foster families have avoided education
entirely. However, it is worth noting that all of the conditions in the statute are
necessary, and a foster family must meet all of them. This raises the question of
what the purpose of the education requirement is. Whether education serves to
instill responsibility in the caretaker and ensure the wellbeing of the child, or,
instead, if the purpose is to ensure the caretaker has been influenced by party
doctrine to some degree and increase the chance that the foster child will be
influenced in turn. This seems a valid question, as other safeguards such as
income requirements, relational harmony requirements, and behavioral
requirements would perhaps suffice absent nine years of introductory education.
The written rationale for each requirement seems to be absent; however, perhaps
both party influence and theoretically instilled common sense in caregivers
would be contributing reasons.
3. Article VIII(f): Maximum Number of Children
The regulation also mandates that a foster family cannot have more than two
foster children if the family has any children under the age of six.89 This replaces
the previous limit of three foster children for any foster family.90 This provision
constitutes one of the major differences between the interim regulations and the
newly enacted regulations, as it was previously absent.91
Reducing the maximum limit of children that a foster family can take care
of will presumably lessen the total number of foster children being taken care of
by foster families. The goal of such a provision would be to forcefully reduce
the number of children a family can take care of to increase the wellbeing of the
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Id.
Id.
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Joanna Chiu, China Changes Foster Parenting Rules to Improve Quality of Care, JOANNACHIU.COM
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://joannachiu.com/2014/12/01/china-changes-foster-parenting-rules-to-improve-quality-ofcare/.
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children who can be cared for. Again, we see the State prioritizing quality over
quantity of care, and perhaps this is in response to inadequate foster care
circumstances—and rightfully so. It is difficult to assess exactly what this means
numerically, as such a nuanced matter tends to be absent from publicized
statistics. However, one can infer that if having a three-child limit was not an
issue with respect to quality of care, the MCA would not have changed the
interim regulations by adding this provision. One can also infer that this
provision will have a positive effect on the quality of care at the expense of the
quantity of care.
C. Initial Common Criticisms of the Provisions
There are some criticisms that can be made against the regulations. One
argument targets the average income and living space provisions.92 The
argument is that because average income and living space means average for a
particular region, this standard can have very disparate results from region to
region.93 This is to say, for instance, that the average income in Zhejiang
Province will be greater than that in Yunnan Province, and so the standard of
living for orphans in Zhejiang Province will generally be better than those in
Yunnan Province. Not only does this provision discriminate against families
wanting to foster children, but it also creates a disparity in care among children,
depending on which province they are in.
As mentioned above, others argue that these regulations disqualify families
who would otherwise be able caretakers. This is different than saying that the
discrimination itself is a fundamental problem; rather, these critics argue that
there are available families with incomes that would qualify in poorer provinces
who could foster children and that average income for a particular region is
therefore not a useful qualifier.94
Despite the criticisms, at a minimum, the regulation facially aims to improve
the care provided. Although short in length, the regulation includes substantial
provisions affecting foster care in China, and while three of such substantial
provisions are listed above, they are by no means the limits of the regulation in
trending towards a more positive quality of care for foster children. For instance,
another provision provides that foster families who discriminate or abuse foster
children will face criminal penalties, and still more, threatens sanctions on

92
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Chiu, supra note 90.
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families that do not cooperate with protective provisions.95 It is evident that with
this regulation, the MCA is acknowledging that a large proportion of foster
children have disabilities96 and is addressing issues that frequent them. Thus, not
every provision of the regulation will necessarily be expected to affect the
quantity of children being cared for; some provisions will solely improve the
quality of care given and keep children safer. Laying out these provisions should
also dispel any myth that China has no laws on the issue.
V. CHARACTERIZING FOSTER CARE
The relative lack of recent scholarship may seem to suggest the foster care
issue has subsided to some degree. However, deeper analysis will reveal that the
MCA is still grappling with ways to solve the issue. The 2004 interim regulations
are the first meaningful laws we have seen ensuring the quality of the care
providers. As of 2014, there were only about 30,000 children officially living
with foster families in China.97 While the 2010 UNICEF estimate claims that
there were approximately 712,000 orphans at that time,98 the implication would
be that foster families themselves are not operating as a viable solution to the
problem of orphan care.
Although it seems that the portion of children being taken care of by foster
families is very small compared to the total approximation of abandoned
children in China, the Chinese government does pay ¥1,100 per child that these
families take in.99 This is not a meager stipend for many Chinese families and
could thus serve as an incentive.100 However, it would make sense that families
in need of such a stipend the most would be those who are least likely to meet
95

Jiating Jiyang Guanli Banfa (家庭寄养管理办法), supra note 76.
High, supra note 53, at 137.
97
Chiu, supra note 90. It may be appropriate to acknowledge that approximately 46,000 Chinese-born
children were adopted by parents in the United States between 2004 and 2014. See Adoption Statistics, U.S.
STATE DEP’T, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/Intercountry-Adoption/adopt_ref/adoption-statistics.
html (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). Some sources even put the number as being “slightly over 100,000 children
abroad for intercountry adoption since the intercountry adoption program was started in the warily 1990s.” See
Smolin, supra note 64. This Comment will not discuss the cultural and social implications of this but cannot
ignore it completely. It has thus been acknowledged and is defined as outside of the scope.
98
Chiu, supra note 90. This is a rise from 573,000 in 2005. China Has 573,000 Orphans, XINHUA
ONLINE, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/05/content_509595.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2018).
99
Chiu, supra note 90.
100
In the last three years, the RMB has been as low as approximately ¥6.04 per dollar, and as high as
approximately ¥6.78 per dollar (as of October 28, 2016). USD to CNY Chart, XE CURRENCY CHARTS,
http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=CNY&view=5Y (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). Using the
lowest exchange rate, ¥1,100 would be approximately $182.11. This may seem to be a small stipend, but it would
nonetheless be some incentive, especially for poorer families.
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all the requirements—particularly the average income requirement. Granted,
some of the poorest provinces may have families above average income for their
province, for whom this would still constitute a viable incentive. Yet in the richer
provinces, there may be families who are below average income for whom this
would not constitute an adequate incentive to take on the duty and responsibility
of caring for an abandoned child—at least in the absence of some other desire to
do so.
While government regulations afford incentives to foster families, they also
provide deterrent features to take preemptive steps to decrease or eliminate
instances of abandonment. Abandonment is penalized under the law, but a lack
of adequate enforcement mechanisms render such threats of penalization largely
ineffective.101 Even if these provisions were enforced, it would seem
exceedingly difficult and expensive to locate the parents of the abandoned child,
and even if that could be done, the child would still need care.
VI. ONE GLARING CRITIQUE: LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
The regulations implemented in 2004 were interim regulations quite similar
to the regulations promulgated in 2014. In fact, there are only a few select
differences.102 Some would argue that enforcement is the major issue today,
which is why quality of care is not up to par.103 But with greater public attention
being paid to the lack of enforcement, it seems that authorities have at least
provided some response. In 2013, a fire in an informal foster home that was not
in compliance with state regulations killed seven of the thirty-four children
residing there.104 The following year, the interim regulations were modified and
the additions were promulgated into law.105 Regardless of whether these new
actions were a direct response to the publicized incident,106 evidently the MCA
is paying greater attention to the issue at hand. Promulgating regulations and
enforcing them seem to both be necessary for a solution if foster care is the route
that the PRC decides to take. If the MCA has a reputation for non-enforcement,
then it seems that these regulations will do little to reduce abandonment rates.
At the very least, having these regulations in place shows there is a procedure

101

High, supra note 53, at 134.
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and even a formal ministerial response to what they could have simply
ignored.107
VII. FOSTER CARE LAW AND NORMS IN CHINESE HISTORY
The complexities of the issue will become apparent in the following
discussion. The discussion will ensue in reverse chronological order in an
attempt to backtrack from the most familiar version of China (the quasiCommunist, post-Mao PRC) to what is perhaps the least familiar. Thus, the
discussion will begin with the post-1949 period, going back to the Maoist period
between 1949 and 1976, and then to the post-revolution period and end of the
Qing Dynasty, also known as the semi-colonial period, and finally to traditional
China. Understanding the changes undergone during these periods is a necessary
component of understanding why modern China’s foster care regulations look
as they do, why the PRC has a dilemma with respect to orphan care, and why
the solution is not as simple as copying Western approaches.
A. Transition from the Communist Welfare State to a Privatized Economy
China’s post-Mao economic reforms began shortly after the death of Mao
Zedong.108 Although the factors that directly caused China’s economic success
remain contested, some scholars argue that China’s economic growth modeled
the development of previously successful “backwards” economies in East Asia
such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.109 These scholars claim that China’s
economic growth was specifically driven by the transfer and growth of labor and
the accumulation of capital—or a high savings rate.110 Other scholars contend
that capital and labor accumulation were only causes insomuch as they promoted
economic growth through technological progress.111 Another approach says that
capital and labor affected efficiency, and efficiency change—along with
technological progress—was the source of the most significant period of

107
Some would say that there is no problem at all and that the quality of China’s foster care system is
actually higher than that of the United States. Yujia Feng, Foster Care: A Solution to Child Abuse and Neglect
in China?, YALE GLOBALIST (Dec. 19, 2013), http://tyglobalist.org/in-the-magazine/roots/foster-care-asolution-to-child-abuse-and-neglect-in-china. Further, Feng would argue that the real problem is, in China,
abused or neglected children are not taken from their parents and put into temporary foster care until a proper
custodian can be found. Id.
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Elizabeth Economy, Don’t Break the Engagement, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 96, 101 (2004).
109
See Ligang Song & Yu Sheng, The Impact of Reform on Economic Grown in China: A Principal
Component Analysis 1 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper No. 2008/12, 2008), http://www.ciaonet.org.
proxy.library.emory.edu/record/1933?search=1.
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Id.
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production in 1993–2002.112 All of these scholars agree that capital
accumulation and labor surplus promoted China’s economic growth, regardless
of whether they differ on specifically how capital and labor did so.
One way to realize higher savings is to cut spending. Cutting more programs
results in fewer costs borne by the State if spending for other programs is not
raised. Cutting or reducing foster care programs funded by the State may have a
negative impact unless the State could somehow develop a market or culture that
benefited from or valued eradication of child abandonment practices and causes.
Prior to the post-Mao reforms, the Communist state dealt with orphans in a
wildly different manner. After the civil war ended, the Guo Min Dang (GMD),
the former ruling Nationalist party in the Republic of China, retreated to Taiwan,
and the Communist party aimed to eradicate the underclass that had resulted
from GMD policies because that underclass was a major source of hardship and
a threat to the Communist party’s authority.113 The civil affairs branches of the
Internal Ministry catalyzed the campaign by arresting urban social deviants,
members of the “old society,” for the purpose of rehabilitating these “conflicts”
to conform with the Maoist ideal and to be productive members of society.114
All major cities established jiaoyangyuan—rehabilitation institutes to
rehabilitate society’s deviants—but these deviants were joined by the disabled,
the elderly, and children; thus, the institutes were instead called shengchan
jiaoyang jigou—production-and-rehabilitation organs.115 The early period of
Mao’s Communist state is marked by a lack of law.116 These objectives and the
means used to attain them were not codified or voted on, but rather authoritative
decisions made by the central government at will.117 Nonetheless, it seems the
State had the utmost interest in accounting for all orphans, even if it did group
them with people from other categories of the reform process—namely,
“delinquents.” This policy seems to have been merely due to convenience,
considering that the State had recently overtaken many private religious and
charitable institutions previously sheltering orphans.118 New centers were indeed
established for deviants after 1949, and the older charitable facilities were also
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used for the same purpose.119 The destruction of the old charities was part of the
Communist state’s need for ideological self-legitimation backed by its hostility
to Christian missions, along with Western intervention in Chinese society.120
Ultimately, the production-and-rehabilitation institutes, also known as Social
Welfare Institutes, were the new medium for orphan care.121
Before Mao’s communist victory over the GMD, the GMD and, previously,
the Ming and Qing dynasties relied on municipal authorities and charitable
groups to manage orphaned infants and children, which they did by establishing
foundling homes (yuyingtang) and child-rearing centers (yuyousuo).122 The
nongovernmental sector of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
an essential part of providing shelter and services to orphans in China.123 Private
individuals, churches, and charities ran private orphanages until the
establishment of the PRC in 1949 (previously the Republic of China while
controlled by the GMD).124 The new Communist regime took pride in putting
an end to “alleged Christian atrocities against Chinese children” by ending the
old system, but some would criticize that the new government was actually
indifferent to orphan welfare125 and that combining orphans and others into the
same institutes was actually so grave an imperfection that recent issues pale by
comparison. Regardless of the imperfections of the system, though, it seems the
State’s incentive for orphan care was maximized, even if the method of doing
so126 was imperfect.127 The incentive came in the form of establishing political
legitimacy.128 One proclaimed imperfection of the communist orphan care
system began when it closed down or took over the private orphanages and took
full responsibility for financing and operating them.129 The new approach
prioritized the collective interest over that of the individual and resolved that
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orphans would be best cared for in institutional settings.130 This imperfection
was reduced in the early 1950s when the State halted surplus countryside labor
from migrating to the cities, largely eliminating urban unemployment.131 In turn,
the production-and-rehabilitation institutes gradually became focused less on
punishment and more on expanding services to orphans, the elderly, and the
disabled.132 However, some argue that this institutional system, which had been
taken over and reorganized by the communists, resulted in a massive downsizing
and reduction of care being afforded to children overall by 1985.133 Although it
appears as if the Communist party has failed on orphan care, history indicates
that in 1978, not long after Mao’s death, when the gaige kaifang (“reform and
opening-up”) period began, the quantity cared for only continued to decrease.134
The reform and opening-up period marked what Western scholars would
consider the beginning of a transition to marketization and joining of the global
economy.135 Mao had roughly twenty-seven years to create his modified
socialist society and bring it up to working standards, and one might say he failed
to improve the State in accordance with his ideals.
After Mao’s death, the high pressure for change had economic, political, and
ideological foundations: agricultural stagnancy and the financial strain within
state-owned enterprises generated economic tension, the aftermath of the
Cultural Revolution and the weakening of the government bureaucracy that
followed created political tension, and private ideological doubts about the
efficacy of communism based on “backwards” economic development and the
in-fighting within the Communist party.136 Based on these factors and the
globalization of the world economy, the Communist party decided to institute
economic reforms to “rejuvenate the country’s economy and to restore the
masses’ confidence in the Communist party as well as the government.”137
The economic and cultural transition after Mao’s death marks the beginning
of modern China and its joining of the West. Although communist in name,
130
Id. at 16. However, this was not the case throughout the entire State, as state-run orphanages were only
located in urban centers. Id. Families and agricultural collectives were responsible for orphan cases in rural areas.
Id. (“Today, the government continues to maintain separate rural and urban child welfare provisions. Orphaned
and abandoned children in cities are cared for in state-run institutions . . . whereas those in the countryside are
expected to receive care from informal kin networks.”).
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China’s joining of the Western international order—especially the WTO—was
not received with a free, uncontrolled welcome but, rather, was stamped with
conditions and requirements that far exceeded those imposed on the average
joiner.138 Thus, the context and circumstances of this “transition” suggest that
China is on its way to conformity and assimilation with Western institutions,139
and that with such conformity, once the transformation is complete, the Chinese
people will realize the democratic civil and political rights that the Western
model claims to best uphold. Yet, despite relative conformity with Western legal
institutions, China still has not achieved success in orphan care. One may
speculate that this is because of China’s incomplete transition into a duplicate of
the Western model or perhaps the opposite: that the Western model is not
conducive for China’s. Indeed, the post-1978 “reform” era continues to the
present day, longer than the entire pre-reform history,140 and it seems the PRC
has still not made substantial progress in this area.
B. Alternative Care in the “Old Society”
Many fail to realize that the reform of legal institutions in China does not
erase its legal history nor its cultural, social, and political underpinnings. This is
to say that China’s coerced conformance with Western standards will not
eliminate its thousands of years of development. While it is true that modernday China and its people have changed dramatically and that changing legal
institutions, government control, and Western influence have undoubtedly taken
their toll on China’s natural development, China’s foundations have not been
entirely changed because of that. It is indeed possible to change the mindset of
the masses through implementation of, or change to, legal institutions, but
changing that mindset does not erase the past.
One might make the argument that prior to the communist defeat of Jiang
Jieshi141 and the GMD, the Nationalist Party had been managing the orphan
population more adequately than any time after, and, before that, society in the
Qing Dynasty had managed it equally well.142 While there were issues
previously mentioned with the “old society’s” care of orphans, one absent
criticism was accounting for orphans. Another argument that might be made
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from the Western perspective is that Western influence was so pervasive at the
end of the Qing Dynasty—and through the entire ROC period—that any
successes that the Qing Dynasty or Nationalist government did have regarding
orphan care, social welfare, and charity law were at least due to Western
influence in these areas. This assumes two things: first, that Western culture and
legal theory had valued orphans and others falling under the category of
society’s disadvantaged; and second, that Chinese society lost its autonomy and
was well on the path towards a full-blown westernized state during these periods,
only to be interrupted by Mao’s unexpected victory. Neither is very likely.
With modern discussion conclusively asserting how “westernized” and
assimilated China has become, this discussion ignores that China has had 5,000
years of history and civilization that cannot be forgotten in a mere several
decades.143 All of the late imperial dynasties, which governed “China” as it
approached the end of its feudal period, accepted the teachings of
Confucianism.144 One may go further to say that, “Confucian ideas have had the
greatest and longest-lasting influence on Chinese culture and society from the
time of Confucius himself up until the present day.”145 Despite the common “Far
Eastern” stereotypes generated by Western culture, Confucian moral philosophy
is not the mystical concept that it is portrayed to be and has been lauded as more
rational than even Western philosophy.146 Furthermore, some have pointed out
that Confucian moral teaching is, at times, similar to Western philosophy and
theology, having similarities that align with Kantian thought and some that align
with traditional Christianity.147 Confucianism is neither an alien concept, nor is
it Western-made. Confucianism’s fundamental virtue, 仁 (ren), is translated as
“benevolence,” but also can be translated as charity, humanity, love, and
kindness.148 The Analects seem to demand that the dynastic ruler adhere to virtue
and exercise a benevolent rule; indeed, Confucius says that a legalistic approach
to governance—namely, by written law with prescriptions of physical
punishment—will teach the people nothing, but a virtuous rule will teach the
people to govern themselves.149 Ideas of benevolence are thus not foreign to
Chinese culture and the previous dynastic rule. This Confucian philosophy led
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the dynastic subjects to grow accustomed to dependence on their ruler to solve
societal and social problems.150
As suggested previously, this culture did not disappear with the rise of
China’s Communist Party (CCP) and its breakdown of the ROC system, or “old
system.” Even the CCP’s new official Marxist-Leninist ideology151—with
Mao’s own twist—did not annihilate China’s unique cultural and social
tendencies.152 In other words, “although modern China is regarded as radically
different in its nature from pre-1949 China, being ‘Communist’, the 53 year
Communist history has not vanquished much of the prior traditional philosophy,
including Confucianism.”153 The CCP undoubtedly tried to break down those
traditional ideas while also relinquishing Western democratic ideas in pursuit of
a class struggle and Communist state, especially during the Cultural Revolution,
but indispensable ideas within Chinese culture of charity or benevolence lasted
despite years of communist attempts to silence traditional ideas.154 This is all to
say that charity itself is not a Western concept, and that the PRC is fully capable
of realizing and generating its own vision of what foster care ought to look like—
a vision that may include charity and benevolence without the West saying it
should be so.
VIII. ARE WESTERN MODELS PERHAPS UNSUITABLE FOR CHINA’S
CONUNDRUM?
As was previously shown, there are generally considered to be two separate
types of alternative care to support orphans in China.155 The first is informal
support from the community (foster care), and the second is institutionalized
support from the government (institutional care).156 Prior to the 1990s,
institutionalized care based on collective values and lifestyle was the primary
method for alternative care.157 Institutionalized care was regarded as the better
option because it “was easier for children to be accepted by the community
organized according to the same ideological principles under which they grew
up.”158 In other words, institutional care is ideologically more in line with the
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Communist state. Today, alternative care in the PRC takes a mixed form, which
took shape after the PRC de-institutionalized orphan care in the 1990s as a
response to high abandonment rates.159 In other words, part of the PRC’s orphan
care system involves an informal kinship system for orphans who have some
form of extended family or a foster care system (as defined by the regulations
above) for those who do not, and the other part consists of a state-monopolized
system designed to care for or support orphans who do not have families or
cannot locate their families.
There are several conventional paths that the PRC can take. First, it could
revert to and try to perfect the Mao-era alternative care system.160 Under this
line of thinking, perhaps institutional, centralized care161 would be more
conducive to the utilitarian idea of the greatest care for the greatest number, but
only if China could curb the financial implications of institutional care.
However, states in the United Nations have generated Guidelines for the
Alternative Care of Children162 that are meant to complement the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), which the PRC ratified in 1992.163 The
Guidelines stipulate that a state should have a system in place that puts children
into foster care (as opposed to institutional care).164 This leaves the PRC to
pursue a second path; namely, the PRC could continue towards the realization
of mirroring the Western model. To that end, it could eliminate institutional care
altogether and try to continue towards achieving that which “developed”
Western nations already have. Third, China could continue trying to strike a
balance between institutional care and foster care, teetering between the typical
care system of a Western developing and developed nation, respectively. But
that is precisely the condition that has created the current dilemma.
The former options are fairly limiting and stiflingly non-innovative. If the
PRC was not under constant scrutiny and pressured to conform to international
standards,165 such as the Guidelines,166 then perhaps it would step outside the
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bounds of convention to develop its own way of dealing with its own problem.167
For instance, perhaps the PRC would opt for an approach that strips choice away
from citizens and places children in their care, along with providing a larger
stipend to care for them. Such an approach would be wildly unpopular in the
West for forcing involuntary burdens on citizens, but would nonetheless be a
way of solving the issue based on collective values.168 On the other hand, the
PRC could embrace the creation of a foster care market and decide to give more
than minute stipends to foster care families, incentivizing families—especially
rural families—with government funded housing169 or a program that would
place rural caretakers into urban government work programs as a benefit for
fostering a child.
The regulations that were analyzed above represent the PRC’s attempt to
increase the quality of care and tighten the qualifications of foster caregivers,
which is in line with the Guidelines.170 Regardless of the effect they have on the
quantity of care (although that is very important), the PRC is clearly achieving
greater conformity with the specifications of the CRC and the Guidelines
provided for it. Yet the number of orphans is still on the rise.171
Regardless of which plan the PRC chooses, if any, there are some certainties
that can be gleaned from this Comment. It should be certain that from the
previous historical explanation of China (including traditional and dynastic
China, the ROC and Western interventionism, the PRC, and modern China) that
the PRC, not having suddenly forgotten its past, is in a somewhat awkward
position with Western impositions, a Communist legacy, and a tradition that has
not been left behind. Further, a Western-like regulatory scheme suggests China’s
desire to conform with the explicit and implied requirements172 that a state ought
to adopt to become part of the globalized world. The PRC has assimilated its
regulations only to see orphan numbers rise.
167
This is not to say the Convention is not an essential part of protecting children internationally, just that
it perhaps does not account for the circumstances that all nations find themselves in. There should be a way to
accomplish both ends.
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CONCLUSION
Even if the PRC suddenly sought to exploit its own autonomy, such that it
ignored the watchful eye of the West, would that benefit the orphan populations
and fix the problem at hand? It is hard to say for many reasons. If the PRC moved
away from global capitalism and back towards strict Maoism, perhaps it could
theoretically achieve more success in providing for its orphan population than a
developing market economy would allow for—but at the expense of economic
prosperity. If the PRC continues towards the Western economic and regulatory
model (as it has by promulgating the regulations initially discussed), perhaps it
will also find success on the alternative care front, as we know “developed”
Western models certainly have. Then again, if the PRC was given leeway to
define its own policies, or even if international agreements took into
consideration the social, political, cultural, and historical circumstances of its
members in crafting agreements, perhaps the PRC would have more success by
crafting its own solutions. The lattermost is the solution that this Comment
advocates for.
The West tends to box China into a Western projection of stereotypes, where
everything wrong with China can be reduced to its traditionalism, communism,
or even simply its lack of success in mirroring Western institutions. As far as
orphan care goes, it seems difficult to make a claim that cultural, historical,
social, political, and economic implications are not the crux of the issue. One
can acknowledge that modern China has dilemmas, including orphan care, that
it needs to improve to meet its own standards while also acknowledging that
China may not require a Western antidote. Further, one can acknowledge that a
Western antidote is not the correct remedy for China’s uniquely complex issues
involving orphan care.
Despite how Western models purport to be universally applicable—and
Western criteria serve as the modern medium for alternative care—there are in
fact states that merit their own tailored model or structure of laws and
regulations—specifically, in this case, for orphan care.173 China is one of them.
NICHOLAS E. BASIL∗
173
For an insightful discussion on one such theory of a modern Chinese political system grounded in
traditional Chinese thought, see, e.g., The Way of Humane Authority: The Theoretical Basis for Confucian
Constitutionalism and a Tricameral Parliament, in JIANG QING, A CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HOW
CHINA’S ANCIENT PAST CAN SHAPE ITS POLITICAL FUTURE (2013).
∗
Executive Managing Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate at Emory University
School of Law (2018); Bachelor of Arts, University of Minnesota (2015). The author would like to thank
Professor Teemu Ruskola for his advice and inspiration in writing this Comment. The author would also like to

BASIL_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

5/15/2018 11:56 AM

thank the Emory International Law Review Executive Board for their input regarding this Comment and for
their extraordinary efforts on Volume 32. Finally, the author would like to thank his wife, family, and friends
for their endless support.

